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Press Coverage of Lone-Actor Terrorism in the UK and Denmark: 
Shaping the Reactions of the Public, Affected Communities and Copycat Attackers 
David Parkerab, Julia M. Pearceb, Lasse Lindekildea, M. Brooke Rogersb 
Aarhus University (a), King’s College London (b) 
Abstract 
Following 9/11, Al-Qaeda-orchestrated plots were considered the greatest threat 
to Western security and sparked the coalition’s war on terror. Close to a decade 
later, the post-9/11 threat landscape had shifted significantly, leading then CIA-
director Leon Panetta to describe ‘the lone-wolf strategy’ as the main threat to the 
United States. Subsequent lone-actor attacks across the West, including the cities 
of London, Nice, Berlin, Stockholm, Ottawa and Charleston, further entrenched 
perspectives of a transformed security landscape in the ‘after, after-9/11’ world. 
The unique features of lone-actor terrorism, including the challenges of interdiction 
and potential of copycat attacks, mean that the media is likely to play a particularly 
important role in shaping the reactions of the public, affected communities and 
copycat attackers. This paper presents findings from a content analysis of British 
and Danish newspaper reporting of lone-actor terrorism between January 2010 
and February 2015. The study highlights that lone-actor terrorism is framed, with 
national variations, as a significant and increasing problem in both countries; that 
Islamist lone-actors are often represented as distinct from far-right lone-actors; 
and that some reporting, despite relatively limited amplification of specific terrorist 
messages, potentially aids lone-actors by detailing state vulnerabilities to attacks. 
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Introduction 
In the wake of 9/11, externally orchestrated acts of terrorism committed by groups such as 
Al-Qaeda were considered the greatest threat to Western security. This perception shaped 
the security policies of the USA and many European states, culminating in the coalition’s 
global war on terror (Bush 2002). Close to a decade later, the post-9/11 threat landscape had 
shifted, and Leon Panetta, then head of the CIA, described ‘the lone-wolf strategy’ as the 
main threat to the US (CBS News News 2010). Subsequent lone-actor attacks across the 
West, including the cities of London, Nice, Berlin, Stockholm, Ottawa and Charleston, have 
further entrenched perspectives of a transformed security landscape in the ‘after, after-
9/11’ world. The emergence of lone attacks as a primary security concern sharpen the focus 
on a range of issues, including media coverage of terrorism. The unique features of lone-
actor terrorism, including the challenges of interdiction and the potential for copycat attacks 
(Gill 2015; Hamm and Spaaij 2017b), mean that the media is likely to play a particularly 
important role in shaping the reactions of the public, affected communities and copycat 
attackers. This paper presents findings from a content analysis of British and Danish 
newspaper reporting of lone-actor terrorism between January 2010 and February 2015. It 
highlights that lone-actor terrorism is framed, with national variations, as a significant and 
increasing problem in both countries. Islamist lone-actors are often represented as distinct 
from far-right lone-actors (who are more likely to be described as mentally ill) and, although 
amplification of specific terrorist messages is rare, some reporting potentially aids lone-
actors by detailing counter-terrorism weaknesses. 
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The term ‘lone-wolf terrorism’ was originally used in reference to far-right actors in the US, 
but since the mid-1990s the term has increasingly been used to describe a range of terrorist 
ideologies. This is especially so in the ‘after, after-9/11’ period with the rise of Islamic State 
and increased concerns about the extreme far-right in Western countries (Vidino, Marone, 
and Entenmann 2017, 16-17; Gartenstein-Ross et al. 2016). There are a range of definitions 
for lone-actors (Bouhana et al. 2017). For the purposes of the paper we define lone-actors 
as unaffiliated individuals who ‘acts on his or her own without orders from—or even 
connections to—an organization’ (Burton and Stewart 2008). However, we include any 
media report using ‘lone-wolf’ that satisfies the search criteria, whatever the newspaper’s 
interpretation of the term. The terminology and its increased use is problematic for several 
reasons, including potential glamorisation of attackers and inaccuracies about attackers’ 
independence (Schuurman et al. 2017). Many policy-makers have stopped using the term, 
but it remains common in media reporting and has entered lay understandings of terrorism. 
Media coverage of the ‘lone wolf’ has become increasingly high profile for several reasons: 
lone attacks in the West have increased in the ‘after, after-9/11’ era (Hamm and Spaaij 
2017b; Pantucci, Ellis, and Chaplais 2016, 1; Simon 2015, 24); some lone attackers (e.g., 
Anders Breivik) have intentionally sought media attention; and terrorist groups, including 
ISIS and Al-Qaeda, have used sophisticated propaganda to promote and glorify lone-actor 
attacks (Hamm and Spaaij 2017b; Shehabat, Mitew, and Alzoubi 2017). This has reignited 
debate about media acting as a mouthpiece for terrorists (Wilkinson 1997; Nacos 2002; Lim 
2016; Winter 2017). Some media have responded positively to these concerns. For example, 
certain French media outlets no longer publish pictures of perpetrators to avoid 
‘posthumous glorification’ (Borger 2016). However, the relationship between terrorists and 
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the media remains symbiotic (Eid 2014, 1-2; Wilkinson 2011, 150; Spencer 2017), as these 
dramatic attacks inevitably end up on the front pages. 
 
It is difficult to establish causality of media influence. However, the literature on media and 
political representations of terrorism is extensive (Jackson 2007; Spencer 2012, 2017), and it 
is generally accepted that the media play a significant role in shaping how people understand 
issues (Norris, Kern, and Just 2003). Even if we accept that ‘terrorism’ is an appropriate label, 
whether it is framed as crime, acts of evil or elements in a wider conflict can influence public 
understanding and subsequent views on counter-measures. Consequently, media framing is 
of particular interest to critical terrorism scholars. Media reporting of lone-actor terrorism 
in the ‘after, after-9/11’ era has the potential to be particularly problematic because of the 
unique features of this form of terrorism and the range of audiences that could be 
influenced. 
 
Three audiences are of particular note when trying to understand the impact of media 
reporting around lone-actor terrorism. The first is the general public. Terrorism is designed 
to instill fear within a wide target audience (Hoffman 2006, 40-41). The low sophistication 
and seemingly random nature of many home-grown lone-actor attacks, compared to 
external attacks by foreign groups, make them more unpredictable and thus potentially 
more concerning for the public. As Pantucci notes, terrorists groups ‘now push out this 
methodology that you should use whatever the hell you have to hand to kill whoever the 
hell you can find’ (Beauchamp 2017). The home-grown aspect can be especially alarming. Of 
the 51 Islamist attacks that took place in Europe and North America between June 2014 and 
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June 2017, 73% were committed by citizens of the country in which the attack took place 
(Vidino, Marone, and Entenmann 2017, 17). Again, when the press uses the lone-wolf 
terminology, it risks sensationalising these acts and further enhancing anxiety in the public 
(Slone and Shoshani 2006). 
 
The second audience is specifically affected communities  For example, with the increase in 
Islamist attacks in the ‘after, after-9/11’ era (Davies 2018; Hanrahan 2017), Muslim 
communities may be at risk from media reports which depict Islam in terms of difference, 
risk, violence (Ahmed and Matthes 2017; Altikriti and Al-Mahadin 2015; Janos 2015; 
Richardson 2009) and terrorism (Khiabany and Williamson 2012; Woods 2007). Findings 
suggest that terrorism often leads to societal bias toward all members of religious or ethnic 
groups affiliated with the perpetrator (Steele et al. 2017, 2). Indeed hate crime against 
Muslims spiked following recent Islamist attacks in the UK (Innes et al. 2016, 12-13; Travis 
2017). Furthermore, media coverage of lone-actors that focuses on the mental health of 
perpetrators has the potential to stigmatise people who are mentally ill and exaggerate the 
prevalence and role of mental illness as a driver for terrorism (Corner and Gill, 2017). 
 
The third audience is potential copycat attackers (Bakker and De Graaf 2011, 46; Gordon, 
Sharan, and Florescu 2015, 244; Lichfield 2014). A significant number of lone-actors in the 
West read literature about other lone perpetrators or copy and reference previous lone 
attacks (Gill, Horgan, and Deckert 2014, 430; Hamm and Spaaij 2017b). This is especially 
concerning if reporting inadvertently glamorises the attacker or amplifies his/her grievance 
or message. Indeed, Haroro suggests that sensationalised anti-hero ‘celebrity reporting’ of 
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perpetrators (think ‘Jihadi John’) may increase their appeal to others (Haroro 2017, 12). 
Media reporting could thus potentially contribute to the decision to commit a terrorist attack 
(and what to target) by indirectly providing inspiration. 
 
Potential copycats may also be inspired by media amplification of state messaging about 
terrorism. Many lone-actors are ‘self-activating’ (Feldman 2013, 271), meaning triggers for 
action are more individual and potentially more rapid than in a coordinated attack. A study 
of lone-actor vehicle attacks suggests that the immediate aftermath of specific political or 
security-related events is more vulnerable to lone-actor attacks, and efforts should be made 
to prevent event-triggered motivation (Perry, Hasisi, and Perry 2017, 11). Amplification of 
state messaging arguably has the potential to contribute to this prevention or inadvertently 
provide inspiration. Content that amplifies counter-terrorism strength (often to reassure the 
public) could introduce doubt into the mind of an attacker by conveying a message of likely 
failure. This may be particularly pertinent for lone-actors, who typically display a higher 
prevalence of social marginalisation (McCauley and Moskalenko 2014; Spaaij 2011; Gill 2015; 
Corner and Gill 2015), which means that their attack planning (especially if rapid) is less likely 
to be detected. Indeed, lone-actors are widely considered more difficult to disrupt by 
traditional methods, such as surveillance (Michael 2014, 50; Perry, Hasisi, and Perry 2017, 
2). Conversely, information designed to increase public vigilance or explain the challenges of 
interdiction could aid attack planning by conveying a message of state weakness to this form 
of attack or provide attackers with information about techniques or targets (Schmid 1989). 
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To increase understandings of media coverage of lone-actor terrorism and its potential 
impact on these three audiences, this article presents results of a quantitative and qualitative 
content analysis of British and Danish newspaper reporting of lone-actor terrorism. This 
cross-country analysis of data from a five-year period is the first in-depth examination of 
media coverage of lone-actors. It sheds light on the specific impacts of lone-actor terrorism 
and contributes to the wider literature on media reporting of terrorism. The next section 
outlines the methodology; the following section presents the results in relation to trends, 
amplification of messaging, and lone-actor framing. Results are discussed in relation to their 
social impacts on the three audiences.  
 
Methodology 
A content analysis of British and Danish national newspaper coverage of lone-actors 
between 1 January 2009 and 28 February 2015 was conducted to: (1) examine trends across 
a five-year period, (2) understand the extent to which the media amplifies either terrorist or 
state messages, and (3) explore how the media frame lone-actors. National daily newspapers 
were selected for analysis as they are the most widely read print media, set the tone for 
public debate and shape the selection of stories for television news coverage and regional 
and local newspaper coverage (Greenslade 2005; Lewis 2005). Both tabloid and broadsheet 
newspapers were included to maximise the range of editorial positions, writing styles and 
potential audiences. 
 
The analysis covers two countries as framing can differ considerably across Western contexts 
(Papacharissi and De Fatima Oliveira 2008) and to allow for identification of broad trends 
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that hold across contexts. The UK and Denmark were selected as both have a history of 
terrorism and have sizeable minority populations. Some aspects are comparable cross-
nationally; others differ. The UK has experienced lone-actor and group-based terrorist 
attacks (Irish nationalism, the 7th July London bombings, the 2013 murder of Lee Rigby in 
Woolwich, attacks on London Bridge, Manchester and Finsbury Park in 2017). Denmark has 
fewer historic encounters with terrorism but has been on high alert since the 2005 Danish 
cartoon crisis and has subsequently experienced several unsuccessful group-based plots and 
three lone-actor attacks (two attempted; one successful). Immigration has been an 
important policy issue in both countries in recent years, but they have different experiences 
in terms of scale and integration. Nevertheless, Muslims make up a sizeable percentage of 
the population in both countries: 6.3% in the UK and 5.3% in Denmark (Hackett 2017, 29-
30). The similarities and differences make the two countries excellent cases for comparing 
media reporting of lone-actor terrorism. 
 
Publications with the highest circulation figures were selected, as the public is most likely to 
have been exposed to this content. The British dataset was drawn from the top-five national 
daily tabloid newspapers (The Sun, The Daily Mail, The Daily Mirror, The Daily Express and 
The Star) and top-five1 national daily broadsheet papers (The Daily Telegraph, The Times, 
The i, The Financial Times and The Guardian). Articles were sourced from the Nexis UK 
database using the search terms [‘lone wolf’ OR ‘solo actor’ OR ‘solo-terror’] AND [‘terroris* 
                                                     
1 Based on Audit Bureau of Circulation (ABC) figures for the newspaper industry published June 2014. 
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OR ‘extremis* OR ‘plan’]. The Danish dataset was drawn from the top-four national daily 
tabloid newspapers (BT, Ekstra Bladet, 24timer, and Metroxpress) and the top four national 
daily broadsheet papers (Berlingske, Jyllands-Posten, Kristeligt Dagblad and Politiken). 
Articles were sourced using the expert search function in Infomedia and the search terms 
[‘Solo-aktør’ OR ‘lone wolf’ OR ‘solo-terror*’ OR ‘soloterror*’] AND [‘terror*’ OR ‘ekstremis*’ 
OR ‘radikalis*’ OR ‘angreb’ OR ‘plan’]. The search string was developed by applying the most 
common terms identified in the grey and academic literatures and then including additional 
search terms identified in the initial pilot search (e.g. the term ‘solo-terrorist’ was found to 
be commonly used in Danish media). ‘Lone-actor’ was used in preliminary searches but was 
rejected during the pilot stage as the term was hardly used in media reporting during the 
period under focus. Nexis UK and Infomedia are two leading media databases in the UK and 
Denmark respectively, providing access to digital archives of print media. LexisNexis has a 
leading position among online databases for academics in North American and Europe and 
is one of the most widely used news archives by social scientists (Tamul and Martínez-Carrillo 
2018, 97-98; Weaver and Bimber 2008, 516). Similarly, Infomedia is the most comprehensive 
database of news coverage from Danish newspapers. As both databases have bias towards 
English and Danish language articles respectively, two separate databases were utilised, a 
common approach for studies looking at cross-national media reporting. 
 
Articles that on review did not pertain to lone-actor terrorism were excluded from the 
analysis. Articles under 200 words were excluded as the study analyses the framings of lone-
actors, rather than simply the number of mentions or articles. Longer articles provide space 
for this framing to be developed and suitable for analysis. Weekend and regional editions 
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were excluded because newsworthy stories, such as terrorism, are covered in the national 
press. Coverage of the same events in regional editions are likely to mirror the national press 
whilst weekend editions often repeat stories and analysis. This process produced a dataset 
of 219 articles in the UK (149 broadsheet and 70 tabloid) and 97 in Denmark (73 broadsheet 
and 24 tabloid). These articles amounted to the full population of articles in both countries 
that matched the search criteria. That the UK saw more articles is a result of lone-actor 
terrorism being a more salient news issue in the UK than in Denmark during the investigated 
period. 
 
The articles were analysed via mixed-methods content analysis. Content analysis was 
developed in the empirical social sciences as a systematic method to reduce large amounts 
of data into a brief description of features of interest (Bauer 2000; Berg 2001). This technique 
makes it possible to code the text systematically using pre-established categories and allows 
different coders to examine the same texts with the same categories, i.e. conduct reliability 
checks (Silverman 2001). This is not to suggest that there is one single valid reading of the 
text. Rather, this approach is procedurally explicit and replicable. Thematic analysis of 
individual texts allows researchers to draw examples to illustrate the findings of the 
systematic coding to supplement quantitative findings. A coding frame was developed to 
enable systematic coding of the articles using pre-established categories to identify their 
focus, content and framings. The coding frame was refined during an iterative process in 
which four coders (two in each country) coded the same batches of UK articles during 
repeated rounds until agreement was reached within the coding team, to ensure inter-coder 
reliability. Where consensus was not reached, those individual variables were deleted from 
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the study – leaving only variables where consensus had been reached. To minimise reliability 
issues the coding was conducted over a short period of time (approx. three weeks). To 
further minimise discrepancies just one coder in each country was used once consensus had 
been reached between the original four coders.  Articles that provided a framing were coded 
for the following frames: mentally ill, criminal, violent, indoctrinated or isolated. An ‘other’ 
category was included to identify frames that we had not anticipated in advance. One article 
may contain multiple framings and be coded for more than one category. The final coding 
frame is available as an online appendix. 
 
Results 
Tabloid and broadsheet results have been collapsed in the following analysis because, in 
contrast to the authors’ expectation, no significant statistical difference in lone-actor framing 
was found in coverage between the two types of newspaper in either country. In the full UK 
dataset, 162 of the articles were reports, 41 were commentary pieces and 16 were reports 
that also included commentary. In the full Danish dataset 39 reports, 29 were commentary 
pieces and 29 were coded as reports that also included commentary. 
 
Reporting trends of lone-actor terrorism 
Table 1 shows the number of articles that focus on lone-actor terrorism in the UK and 
Denmark by year and publication type for all full years. 
 
TABLE 1 
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UK coverage increased from two articles in 2009 to 69 in 2014 (the last full year analysed). 
Most references to ‘lone wolf’ appeared in articles discussing lone-actor terrorism generally 
(38.8%) or in reports covering attacks or attempted attacks by lone-actors (32%). Discussion 
of policy to address the threat was limited (14.6%). In Denmark, the number of articles 
increased from zero in 2009 to 28 in 2012 and declined from 2012 to 2014 (last full year 
analysed). However, in the two first months of 2015, 11 articles referred to the topic. Most 
references to ‘lone wolf’ appeared in articles concerning lone-actor terrorism in general 
(58.8%) or in reports describing attacks or attempted attacks involving a lone-actor (21.7%). 
 
The results suggest that media coverage is generally increasing, despite fluctuations in 
Denmark, and that media coverage of lone-actor terrorism is highly event driven. In the 
Danish data, the surge in coverage in 2011 is due to Anders Behring Breivik’s attack in 
Norway and the Danish court case against Lors Doukiev. The bulk of 2012 coverage 
concerned the shooting of four Jews in Toulouse, France, by Muhammad Merah, and the 
court case of the first lone-actor attack on Danish soil, Mohammed Geele’s axe-attack on 
cartoonist Kurt Westergaard. The tendency to focus on nearby and/or local Danish events is 
also clear in 2013 where about 25% of the published articles deal with the attack on Danish 
Islam critic Lars Hedegaard outside his apartment. The unusually high volume of coverage in 
the beginning of 2015 is connected to the worst lone-actor attack in Denmark to date – the 
attacks on a free speech debate and the Jewish synagogue in Copenhagen on February 14-
15, where three people were killed by Omar Abdel Hamid El-Hussain. British coverage is also 
event driven as illustrated by peaks in the frequency of articles focusing on far-right terrorism 
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following Anders Breivik’s attacks in Norway 2011 (when 43.5% of far-right terrorism 
coverage appeared) and in 2013 following Pavlo Lapshyn’s attacks on mosques in the UK 
(when 30.4% of coverage of far-right terrorism occurred). British publications focus on 
attacks closer to home as well as further afield. As Figure 1 shows, the largest peaks in 
coverage followed the May 2013 attack on Lee Rigby in London, the Canadian parliament 
attack in October 2014, and the Sydney and Paris attacks late 2014/early 2015. 
FIGURE 1 
Content-wise, reporting in both countries primarily focused on Islamist terrorism. In the UK 
dataset, 73.5% discussed Islamist terrorism, 10.5% far-right terrorism, 8.7% discussed more 
than one category of terrorism, and 7.3% discussed lone-actor terrorism in general without 
specifying a particular category of terrorism. Articles that discussed more than one category 
generally referred to both Islamist and far-right terrorism, and Irish dissident terrorism and 
anarchist terrorism were also mentioned. In Denmark, 60% of articles focused exclusively on 
Islamist terrorism, 6.1% on far-right terrorism, and about 32% discussed more than one type 
of terrorism. 
 
Finally, reporting in both countries presented lone-actor terrorism as a significant security 
threat. Of the 106 British articles that discussed the likelihood or scale of the threat posed 
by lone-actors, 63.2% characterised lone-actor terrorism as a frequent or large problem, and 
28.3% described it as an increasing problem. Only five articles framed lone-actor terrorism 
as rare. Of the 76 Danish articles that discussed the likelihood or scale of the threat, 48.6% 
characterised lone-actor terrorism as a frequent or large problem, and 46.0% described it as 
an increasing problem. Only one article framed lone-actor terrorism as rare. 
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Amplification of terrorist and state messaging 
All reports about terrorism have the potential to promote terrorist agendas, but only a few 
articles in both countries amplified a lone-actor grievance or goal in detail. 19 British articles 
(8.7%) directly quoted lone-actor messages, and 13 articles (5.9%) indirectly acted as a 
conduit for the message (e.g. reporting lone-actors’ claims regarding motivation). For 
example, the Daily Mail reported that Omar Abdel El-Hussein had declared allegiance to ISIS 
on Facebook minutes before the attack, directly quoting his post and lyrics to ‘The Sword of 
Jihad’, a song he posted about destroying the West (Martin 2015). Following the murder of 
Lee Rigby, the Daily Telegraph reported that ‘Adebolajo and Adebowale claimed they were 
"soldiers of Allah" and the killing was legitimate because the British people were at a war 
with Muslims’ (Whitehead and Dixon 2013). In Denmark, two articles directly quoted 
attackers, and four indirectly conveyed lone-actors’ messages by describing their claims. 
Berlingske, for instance, directly quoted the video Adebolajo recorded after murdering 
Rigby: ‘eye for an eye, tooth for tooth’ (Bjerre 2013). 
 
In comparison, amplification of state messaging was significant in both countries. In the UK, 
104 articles (47.5%) included statements from elected UK officials, security officers or 
intelligence services. However, only 33 (31.7%) of these discussed the state’s counter-
terrorism capabilities: 13 of which included counter-terrorism strengths, 12 included 
counter-terrorism vulnerabilities and eight included both weaknesses and strengths. The 21 
articles amplifying counter-terrorism strengths (solely or in combination with vulnerability) 
drew attention to heightened security (e.g. following the death of Bin Laden); highlighted 
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effectiveness of counter terrorism in the run-up to large events (e.g. London Olympics); 
described allocation of extra resources (e.g. following Breivik’s attacks in Norway); and 
publicised the scale of terrorism plots foiled by UK security services. For example, the Daily 
Telegraph amplified messaging about Olympic security: 
 
Boris Johnson, the Mayor of London, and the Metropolitan Police Commissioner 
Bernard Hogan-Howe warned yesterday that a ‘lone wolf’ attack during the Games 
was a distinct security concern. But the commissioner added that ‘we have things 
in place to prevent that happening’. 
(Kirkup 2012) 
 
The Guardian quoted David Cameron’s praise for the security services: 
 
There have been a series of plots that have been detected and prevented, that 
would have seen police officers or other authority figures murdered in cold blood, 
as Lee Rigby was murdered in cold blood. It’s thanks to the brilliance of our policing 
and security services that these things have been prevented. 
(Wintour and Dodd 2014) 
 
Statements about counter-terrorism strength tended to be issued prior to major public 
events and following terrorist incidents. However, eight of the post-event statements also 
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included messages from official sources that highlighted challenges and therefore potential 
vulnerabilities to lone-actor attacks. The 20 articles that described difficulties in interdicting 
lone attacks focused primarily on online or self-radicalisation. For example, a Daily Mail 
article, ‘Jihadi Attacks on the UK Inevitable’, reported that: 
 
Sir Bernard [head of London’s Metropolitan Police] said there was a ‘growing 
concern about the risk of a lone wolf attack on British Streets … It doesn’t take an 
awful lot of organising, doesn’t take too many to conspire together, there’s no great 




Similarly, a Daily Mirror article reported that: 
 
After a lone wolf gunman murdered two in Copenhagen before being shot dead at 
the weekend, fears were growing the wave of violence by Islamist extremists 
could spread here at any moment. MI5 believe it is ‘only a matter of time’. 
(Collins 2015) 
 
Despite some national differences, similar trends were apparent in the Danish data. Of 53 
articles (54.7%) including messaging from officials, a higher proportion included specific 
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content about counter-terrorism strengths or weaknesses, at just over 50% compared to 
31.7% in the UK. 17 of these 27 articles communicated Danish counter-terrorism strengths, 
and 10 communicated the interdiction challenges posed by lone-actors. A key theme in 
articles amplifying state messaging about counter-terrorism strengths was increased 
surveillance of online radicalisation. For instance, Berlingske quoted officials from the Danish 
Security and Intelligence Service’s new task force: 
 
We will increase surveillance on the internet, we follow what goes on in relevant 
web fora, but it is also about enforcing the IT-investigatory capacity so that we can 
interdict and stop individuals who are planning criminal activities. This will include 
wiretapping. People like Anders Breivik radicalise online, and therefore the internet 
is our best chance of identifying lone actors. 
(Haslund and Beck Nielsen 2011) 
 
Other reports, for instance in BT, reinforced this message: 
 
The Danish Security and Intelligence Service is already keeping an eye on online chat 
rooms with an extremist content. However, now they establish a task force 
dedicated to this search for potential terrorists who communicate with each other 
online, be it Islamist or rightwing extremists. ‘Most terrorist activity happens online 
nowadays. And we are especially looking for solo-terrorists who work alone’. 
(Karker 2012) 
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The majority of articles emphasising counter-terrorism strength were post-event responses. 
For instance, following attacks by Breivik, some reports focused on the authorities’ increased 
surveillance of fertilizers. Jyllands-Posten wrote: 
 
Danish tax authorities are increasingly watching out for ‘suspicious transactions’ 
when it comes to the import of fertilizers. The national board of Nature and 
Businesses has 10-12 people employed who are monitoring and checking that only 
registered farmers and businesses are buying fertilizers, and checking that the 
bought products actually fit the plants the farmer is producing. 
(Ellegaard and Bonde Broberg 2011) 
 
Following the Copenhagen attacks in February 2015, Berlingske reported then Danish prime 
minister Helle Thorning Schmidt’s trust in the Danish counter-terrorism efforts: 
 
I don’t think there are any major holes in our defence against terrorism. We have a 
very robust counter-terrorism system. This is demonstrated by several previous 
foiled plots. We also had a robust system and response last Saturday. The police did 
a great job. 
(Stigsgaard Nissen and Bjørnager 2015) 
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As in the UK, Danish post-event reporting includes details of vulnerability alongside articles 
on counter-terrorism strengths. Most of the 10 articles in which state actors highlighted 
difficulties in preventing lone attacks also tended to follow terrorist incidents. Messaging 
conveying vulnerability generally focused on two areas. The first explains why it is not 
possible to prevent lone-actor events. Jyllands-Posten reported that: 
 
The lone wolf-terrorist is characterized by not having spoken to anybody before he 
attempts an attack. This makes it much more difficult for security services to 
interdict than in the case of large and more complex attacks. 
(Ellegaard and Boddum 2012) 
 
The second theme was the adaptability of terrorists and the difficulties tracing them. 
Kristeligt Dagblad wrote: 
 
Terrorist attacks carried out by ‘solo-terrorists’ […] are difficult to prevent as the 
planning leaves the police and security services with few leads and traces. 
Furthermore, terrorists are constantly developing new methods and tactics, which 
makes it difficult for authorities to trace their communication. They use new 
platforms of communication and are increasingly using encryption. Authorities have 
to be up to speed, says a source at PET [The Danish Security and Intelligence 
Service]. 
(Weichardt 2015) 
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Framing of lone-actors 
A substantial minority of reports described actors using labels that provide a frame for 
understanding lone-actor types. 98 British articles (44.7%) and 30 Danish articles (30.9%) 
provided a frame. Of the 98 British articles, 70 (71.4%) were in the context of Islamist 
terrorism, 18 (18.4%) in the context of far-right terrorism and 1 (1%) in the context of 
anarchism. Nine articles (9.2%) framed actors in the context of more than one category of 
terrorism (although primarily Islamist). Of the 30 Danish articles, 13 (43.3%) were in the 
context of Islamist terrorism, 4 (13.3%) in the context of far-right terrorism and 13 (43.3%) 
in more than one category of terrorism. The larger proportion of articles that focus on 
Islamist terrorism reflects the higher frequency of articles in both national datasets that 
focus on this topic rather than a greater tendency to characterise lone-actors as Islamist 
attackers. Indeed, UK articles were more likely to be coded as providing a frame for lone-
actors if they focused on far-right terrorism, with 78.3% of articles on far-right terrorism 
coded for framing compared to 43.5% of articles that on Islamist terrorism. 
 
The nature of the dataset – having relatively few cases for each ideologically motivated lone-
actor attack and the event-driven nature of reporting – means the findings cannot be 
considered generalizable to all right-wing and Islamist cases. Nevertheless, the differences 
in coverage are striking and, we argue, not solely a product of the individual cases that 
dominate the dataset as the articles often reference lone-actors in broad terms or about 
specific attackers coming from a particular sub-set of society without reference to their 
personal biographies. Results show clear differences in framing between Islamist and far-
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right lone-actors; especially in the UK. Table 2 shows the number of British articles coded in 
order of frequency and by category of terrorism: 
TABLE 2 
This breakdown shows that Islamist actors tend to be framed in relation to crime and 
violence, both explicitly in criminal terms and indirectly in articles that feature criminal 
aspects in their biographical information – with reporters explicitly referencing this feature 
between separate cases. For example from The Guardian: 
 
Commentators pointed out that Merah and the suspect in the Jewish museum 
shootings came from similar backgrounds and had engaged in petty crime before 
becoming radicalised in prisons. 
(Penketh 2014) 
 
Similarly, a commentary piece concerning the attack on a café in Sydney by Man Haron 
Monis, also in The Guardian, included broad comments about criminality and the types of 
individual that commit lone attacks: 
 
Like automatons, those with grievances, with criminal pasts awaiting trial, have 
now learned the phraseology of otherness and resistance, through the 
employment of symbols. Beneath that black flag lurks some unspeakably 
monstrous dimension, exposed through attacks like Monis's. The spectre of the 
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violent jihadist haunts our social imaginary. In response, that imaginary has 
become a place to play, and a place to redeem criminality and intolerance by 
turning them into a false pursuit of justice. 
(Morsi 2014) 
 
Notably, it is only in the context of Islamist terrorism that lone-actors were characterised as 
indoctrinated. From the Sun: 
 
A security source said: This man [Anwar al-Awlaki] uses every conceivable network 
to pollute the minds of his followers. He was directly responsible for brainwashing 
this young woman [Roshonara Choudhry who committed a lone-actor knife attack] 
into trying to kill a British MP. 
(Sullivan 2010) 
 
A report two years later in the same publication suggested that: 
 
Driving in a heavy machine-gun convoy across Mogadishu this week, it is the 
knowledge that indoctrinated Britons could have you in their sights that is perhaps 
most unnerving. 
(MacDougall 2012) 
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In contrast, far-right actors in the British data were more than twice as likely to be described 
in relation to mental health issues. For example, a Daily Mail article stated that: 
 
Last night Scotland Yard was trying to unravel a complex web of links between the 
crazed neo-Nazi [Anders Breivik] and British extremists. 
(Gysin 2011) 
 
In the Danish data, criminality also featured heavily, although mental illness and violent were 
the most common framings. For example, Politiken suggested: 
 
If we want to prevent foreign fighters and lone-actor extremist attacks, we need 
to prioritize treatment of mental health problems among vulnerable individuals. 
(Sheikh 2015) 
 
Table 3 shows the number of Danish articles in order of frame frequency: 
TABLE 3 
In general, the difference in framing of Islamist and far-right lone-actors is small in the Danish 
data. However, Islamist actors are twice as likely as far-right actors to be framed as criminal 
and violent (often combined). Sometimes these elements of lone-actors’ pasts are used to 
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help explain their deeds or as characteristics that are shared by a relatively large subsection 
of the population, as the following from Politiken illustrates: 
 
Omar El-Hussain had been convicted of violence. He had been to prison, he had been a 
gang member. This profile he shares with several hundred young Muslims in Copenhagen 
alone, whom authorities have not been able to integrate. Little suggested that Omar 
would deviate from the others and choose to become a holy warrior. 
(Pundik 2015) 
 
Other articles made similarly broad categorisations, for instance in Kristeligt Dagblad: 
 
The solo-terrorist of today is far more likely to be a petty criminal and a socially 
challenged and isolated individual who feels in opposition to mainstream society 
and who seeks excitement in life. Al-Qaeda is determined to recruit from exactly 
this group via the internet. 
(Søndergaard 2011) 
 
While the dominant framings in both countries were criminal, violent and mentally ill, a 
significant number of ‘other’ framings in the British data further highlighted differences in 
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framings of far-right and Islamist lone-actors. Table 4 shows the additional frames identified 
within this subset2: 
TABLE 4 
Of the 52 British articles coded for an ‘other’ framing, 23 characterised lone-actors as 
fanatics, making this the fourth most common framing. A Sun report reported that, ‘Lone-
wolf fanatics pose the greatest terror threat now, a security expert warned last night (2011). 
In 2013, The Daily Telegraph reported: 
 
The Woolwich attack has all the hallmarks of the very nightmare MI5 [the UK 
intelligence service] has feared – low-key fanatics arming themselves with basic 
weapons and targeting a soldier or other victim at random. 
(Whitehead 2013) 
 
Although ‘fanatic’ implies a single-minded interest that is outside of the norm, it does not 
necessarily imply diagnosable mental illness (although the two are often seemingly 
conflated).  This distinction is made explicit in a 2014 Times article which noted that ‘”It does 
not matter whether these criminal acts were the deeds of fanatics or individuals with 
psychiatric problems”, the newspaper [Figaro] said.’ (Bremner 2014) 
                                                     
2 A minimum of three instances were required for the identification of a frame. 
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The most frequently observed ‘other’ framing applied to far-right actors (and second-most 
frequent framing for far-right actors after mental illness) was ‘evil’. The Daily Star quotes a 
Norwegian police official describing Breivik as a ‘sociopathic lone wolf who kept his diabolic 
plans to himself … He is total evil’ (Hughes 2011). 
 
Despite the frequent characterisation of far-right actors as mentally ill and/or evil, they were 
still more likely to be described as skilful or well-educated in comparison with Islamist 
terrorists (10.5% vs. 2.6%), as the following example from The Times highlights: 
 
The security profile of the far-right ‘lone wolf’ is that of a male who is older than his 
Islamist counterpart, more integrated in his community, with a better education 
and employment history and more skilled at making and acquiring weapons. 
(O'Neill and San 2013) 
 
Another contrast between framings of Islamist and far-right actors is the greater tendency 
to characterise Islamist lone-actors in general as young, particularly ‘young men,’ as 
illustrated in the Daily Mirror and Daily Telegraph: 
 
Thousands of lone wolf Islamic extremists could launch similar attacks to the 
Woolwich bloodbath, a senior police officer warned yesterday. Assistant 
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Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police Cressida Dick said that the threat cannot 
be eradicated while young men in the UK become radicalised via the internet. 
(Myers 2013) 
 
And so long as the mullahs continue to pump out their poisonous rhetoric, there 




Although most representations highlight lone-actors’ differences from the general 
population, a small proportion (8.2%) framed lone-actors as ‘normal’ prior to their attacks. 
 
Discussion 
These findings contribute insights into five key debates on media reports on terrorism or the 
impacts of lone-actor terrorism, all of which relate to at least one of the three audiences 
identified in the introduction. First, most articles in our dataset do not report terrorist 
messaging in detail. This challenges the claim that the media problematically amplifies 
terrorist narratives. We do not reject the suggestion that coverage of lone-actor terrorism 
may act as a ‘force multiplier for terrorist campaigns’ (Hamm and Spaaij 2017a, 177), but our 
findings support a smaller body of studies which conclude that only a minority of reports 
actively and in detail convey terrorist grievances (Abrahms 2014, 8). 
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Second, in analysing media amplification of state messaging, this paper goes beyond extant 
studies by considering a wider range of message amplification that could influence copycat 
attackers. Although amplification of state messaging exceeds coverage of terrorist 
messaging, state messaging that could indirectly deter or inspire attackers is approximately 
equal in volume. Indeed, in the UK, more articles combined amplify terrorist narratives or 
state counter-terrorism weakness than state counter-terrorism strengths. This highlights the 
potential for reporting to contribute to copycat attacks. That most state amplification is 
event driven is especially important. Europol highlights that post-attack messaging from 
groups such as ISIS is ‘designed to inspire a copycat effect in audiences’ and concludes that 
a post-incident communication strategy is necessary to mitigate against further attacks 
(Reed and Ingram 2017, 13). Similarly, researchers have found that the immediate period 
after security-related events is more vulnerable to lone-actor attacks and efforts should be 
taken to prevent this event-triggered motivation (Perry, Hasisi, and Perry 2017, 11). Media 
amplification of state or terrorist messaging that could indirectly inspire or deter copycats in 
this period could thus be especially relevant. 
 
Third, our data supports the contention that Muslims are framed as distinct or negatively in 
media reports, including in relation to terrorism (Ahmed and Matthes 2017; Khiabany and 
Williamson 2012). The differences in framing between Islamist and far-right lone-actors was 
especially pronounced in the British data. Whilst the limitations of the datasets means 
findings cannot be assumed to be automatically generalizable, Islamist actors were most 
likely to be depicted as criminal or violent and were often portrayed as having characteristics 
typical of Muslim youth. In contrast, far-right actors were twice as likely to be labelled 
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mentally ill and were frequently framed as evil, more individualistic framings. Framing 
Muslim attackers as distinct to other types of attacker or as potentially representative of a 
sub-set of a community may further antagonise Muslims who already view press depictions 
of Muslims as discriminatory and negatively shape public perceptions of this affected 
community. Indeed, some research suggest that such reports can act as a contributing 
radicalising influence by fuelling existing perceptions that Muslims are treated as an out 
group (Gurski 2016; Parker et al. 2017). Such outcomes may inadvertently support 
propaganda by terrorist groups like ISIS who have warned the public in the West that ‘you 
will pay the price as you walk on your streets, turning right and left, fearing the Muslims’ 
(Vidino, Marone, and Entenmann 2017, 29). 
 
One reason for the greater media focus on Islamist terrorism is that more attacks were 
carried out by Islamist actors during the period of analysis. However, a comparison of the 
two lone-actor events that took place in the UK during this period – the murder of Lee Rigby 
in Woolwich London (an Islamist attack) and the murder of Mohammed Saleem and 
attempted bombing of mosques in Birmingham (a far-right attack) – suggests that the 
category of terrorism may also affect the volume of media coverage of an event. The attacks 
took place the same year, in the same country and both had one fatality. The Woolwich 
attack was filmed, whereas the Birmingham attacks were covert. Nonetheless, the British 
media coverage differs considerably in terms of the focus drawn by the publicity-seeking 
nature of the Woolwich attacks (which resulted in 21 articles in the immediate aftermath 
compared to six on the Birmingham attacks) and the enduring symbolic value of the attack. 
In 2014, the Woolwich attacks were mentioned in 20 articles; the Birmingham attacks were 
not mentioned again. Whilst these two cases have similarities, they are not sufficiently like-
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for-like to make firm conclusions about ideology being the primary factor in the level of 
reporting received (e.g. Breivik had self-publicised a lot). However, it does seem to 
tentatively  support the work of Kearns, Betus and Lemieux (forthcoming) which finds that 
that terrorist attacks receive significantly more press attention when the perpetrator is 
Muslim. 
 
Fourth, the fact that framings in media coverage are not always reflective of the 
characteristics of lone attackers has the potential to stigmatise affected communities. The 
common framings of lone attackers as young (especially young Muslims) or mentally ill are 
especially pertinent. While these are genuine characteristics of some lone attackers, they 
are minority characteristics or in line with group-based terrorists or even the general 
population. For instance, Gill, Horgan and Deckert (2014, 427-428) found that lone-actors 
are typically older than group-based terrorists. Indeed, although some younger Muslims 
radicalise, the average age is not unusually young, and nearly a third of Islamist attackers 
between June 2014 and June 2017 were over 30 (Vidino, Marone, and Entenmann 2017, 16). 
In terms of mental illness, some researchers suggest that assumptions of its prevalence are 
partly fuelled by poor reporting using mental illness as a ‘silver bullet’ to explain terrorist 
involvement (Corner and Gill 2017, 1). Findings indicate that lone-actors have a higher 
prevalence of mental illness than group-based terrorists and the public at large. 
Nevertheless, at approximately 40% (Corner, Gill, and Mason 2016, 563), it remains a 
minority characteristic. Broad framing of lone attackers as ‘crazed’ or mentally unwell could 
influence public perceptions of mental illness. Indeed, studies have found that reporting on 
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terrorist acts by perpetrators with suspected mental illness increased public perceptions of 
mental illness as dangerous and unpredictable (Schomerus et al. 2017). 
 
Finally, the media in both countries describe lone-actor terrorism as an increasing and/or 
existing significant problem. It is almost never framed as rare. As noted, the increase in 
attacks is recognised in the literature, and lone attacks are a significant concern. Indeed, the 
US and Europe experienced approximately twice as many successful lone attacks in 2015 and 
2016 as they did between 2011 and 2014 (Byman 2017). However, to suggest that it is 
common is not reflective of reality, as the overall number of attacks remains low. For 
example, despite heightened counter-terrorism awareness in Denmark following the 2005 
cartoon crisis there have subsequently been only three attempted and one successful lone-
actor attack. A review by RUSI of all lone-actor plots and attacks across 30 European 
countries (EU member states plus Norway and Switzerland) between 1 January 2000 and 31 
December 2014 identified 72 attacks and concluded that ‘lone-actor terrorism in Europe is 
rare’ (Ellis et al. 2016, vi). The need for public vigilance makes coverage of the risks of lone-
actor terrorism important. Nevertheless, inaccurate framing of such attacks as commonplace 
has, in combination with the sensationalist ‘lone-wolf’ terminology, the potential to increase 
public anxiety and exacerbate the social divisions that terrorism can cause. 
 
Conclusion 
In conclusion, the emergence of lone-actor terrorism as a primary (if not the primary) 
security threat facing many Western states represents a fundamental ‘after, after-9/11’ shift 
from the post-9/11 era terrorist threat landscape. This has refocused the debate about press 
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reporting of terrorist attacks because of the unique features of lone attacks, i.e., potential 
copycat attackers, negative social implications of home-grown attackers, and possible 
anxiety in the public, especially when the media use the sensationalist ‘lone wolf’ 
terminology. This paper highlights that press reporting in both countries frequently frames 
lone-actor terrorism as a significant and increasing problem. In both countries, but especially 
in the UK, reporting differentiates between Islamist and far-right lone-actors. Islamists are 
more often framed as a criminal and violent sub-set of a community, and far-right actors are 
more likely to be framed as mentally ill or evil. Finally, the data shows that amplification of 
specific terrorist messages is rare and is outweighed by amplification of state messages. 
State messaging not only highlights counter-terrorism strength, which potentially deters 
attackers; it also includes details on counter-terrorism weakness and state vulnerabilities, 
which may aid the attack planning of potential lone-actors. Press coverage thus has a clear 
potential to shape the reactions of the public, affected communities and copycat attackers 
in both positive and negative ways.  
 
The study leaves open several avenues for further research. In particular, future research 
conducting focused comparisons of similar cases with different ideological backgrounds 
could provide useful results concerning the influence of perpetrator ideology on the levels 
of media coverage and framing. Comparisons of cases both before and after the attacker’s 
ideology has been identified, such as the case of Mohammed Salem’s murder where Pavlo 
Lapshyn was not identified as the killer until weeks later, would add additional nuance to 
understandings of the media coverage of lone-actor terrorism. 
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SUPPORTING TABLES AND FIGURES: 
Press Coverage of Lone Actor Terrorism in the UK and Denmark: 







UK DATA  DANISH DATA 
Publication type Total Publication type Total 
Broadsheet Tabloid  Broadsheet Tabloid  
2009 2 (1.3%) 0 (0%) 2 (0.9%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 
2010 10 (6.7%) 5 (7.1%) 15 (6.8%) 9 (12.3%) 4 (16.7%) 13 (13.4%) 
2011 18 (12.1%) 11 (15.7%) 29 (13.2%) 18 (24.6%) 8 (33.3%) 26 (26.8%) 
2012 20 (13.4%) 11 (15.7%) 31 (14.2%) 22 (30.1%) 6 (25.0%) 28 (28.9%) 
2013 32 (21.5%) 15 (21.4%) 47 (21.5%) 14 (19.2%) 2 (8.3%) 16 (16.5%) 
2014 50 (33.6%) 19 (27.1%) 69 (31.5%) 2 (2.7%) 1 (4.1%) 3 (3.9%) 
 
 




FIGURE 1  
 












Criminal  34 (44.2%) 1 (5.3%) 1 (50%) 36 (36.7%) 
Violent  25 (32.5%) 3 (15.8%) 1 (50%) 29 (29.6%) 
Mentally ill 19 (24.7%) 8 (53.3%) 1 (50%) 28 (28.6%) 
Indoctrinated  11 (14.3%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 11 (11.2%) 
Isolated  10 (13.0%) 1 (5.3%) 0 (0%) 11 (11.2%) 
 
* These figures include nine articles that were originally coded for >1 category, 7 of which contained 
framings for Islamist actors and 1 of which contained framings for Far Right actors. 
 
**  This figure refers to the article originally coded for >1 category that provided a non-category specific 
framing of lone actors and the article that was coded as ‘other’ which referred to an ‘anarchist’ lone 
actor.   
 
Table 2: Frequency (percentage of total no. of UK articles that provide an actor framing)  






Frame (n=30)  
Mentally ill 11 (36.7%) 
Violent  11 (36.7%) 
Criminal 9 (30.0%) 
Isolated  7 (23.4%) 
Indoctrinated 0 (0%) 
 
Table 3: Frequency (percentage of total no. of Danish articles that provide an actor framing)  




















Fanatic 20 (26%) 3 (15.8%) 0 (0%) 23 (23.5%) 
Young men 7 (9.1%) 1 (5.3%) 0 (0%) 8 (8.2%) 
Normal 6 (7.8%) 2 (10.5%) 0 (0%) 8 (8.2%) 
Skilled/Educated 2 (2.6%) 2 (10.5%) 1a (50%) 5 (5.1%) 
Evil 0 (0%) 4 (21.1%) 0 (0%) 4 (4.1%) 
Disaffected 4 (5.2%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 4 (4.1%) 
 
   a This figure refers to an article that was originally coded for >1 category that provided a framing of 
lone actors as skilled actors in the context of both Far Right and Islamist terrorism.   
 
Table 4: Frequency of articles (percentage of all UK articles that provide a frame) for each ‘other’ frame 
identified in the sample by category of terrorism 
 
 
